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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1088 
___________ 
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v. 
 
MIFFLIN COUNTY REGIONAL POLICE DEPARTMENT; CPL. ROBERT L. 
HAINES, JR.; LT. STEVE KNUDSON; PTLM ETTINGER, Mifflin Regional 
Department; CHIEF WILLIAM HERKERT, JR.; UNKNOWN BOOKING AND 
INTAKE OFFICERS; UNKNOWN DISTRICT ATTORNEY;  
UNKNOWN DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
 
JAMES E. MURPHY, 
 Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:09-cv-02261) 
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Martin C. Carlson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 16, 2013 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SHWARTZ and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 16, 2013) 
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_________________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Jimmy Murphy appeals from the District Court’s denial of his 
motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) & (b), motion for the appointment of counsel, 
and the entry of judgment following a jury verdict in favor of the defendants.  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm. 
I. 
 On January 10, 2008, Officers Haines and Ettinger of the Mifflin County Regional 
Police Department were dispatched to investigate illegal drug activity at the bus terminal 
in Lewistown, Pennsylvania.  After arriving at the terminal, they observed Murphy and 
his companion loitering in an area known for drug activity.  Haines asked Murphy where 
he and his companion were going, and he replied that they were waiting for friends to 
pick them up and take them to Huntingdon, Pennsylvania.  Murphy produced 
identification but refused to consent to a search of his person and backpack.  Haines and 
Ettinger handcuffed Murphy and transported him to the police station to wait for the state 
canine unit.  While there, Murphy consented to a search of his backpack, which revealed 
several cans of deodorant, plastic baggies, sandwich bags, and razor blades.  However, no 
narcotics were located, and Murphy was released.
1
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 In July 2009, Murphy was convicted of various drug charges in an unrelated federal 
criminal trial.  See United States v. Murphy, M.D. Pa. Crim. No. 1:08-cr-00433.  Officer 
Haines testified about the January 10, 2008 encounter during this trial. 
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 In 2009, Murphy filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the defendants subjected 
him to an unlawful search and seizure, illegal arrest, and illegal racial profiling.  He also 
alleged that the defendants’ actions resulted from a failure to train or properly supervise.  
The District Court granted in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed 
Murphy’s racial profiling claims and his claims for equitable relief.  The District Court 
also granted summary judgment for the Mifflin County Regional Police Department on 
the basis that a police department is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. 
 Murphy filed a motion for the appointment of counsel prior to trial, which was 
denied.  The jury trial for his remaining claims began before the Magistrate Judge
2
 on 
January 7, 2013, and lasted until January 8, 2013, when the jury returned a verdict in 
favor of the defendants.  This appeal followed.  The Magistrate Judge subsequently 
denied Murphy’s motions for a new trial and to alter or amend the judgment.3 
II. 
A. Denial of Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law 
 Murphy first argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in denying his motions for 
judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) and (b).  We exercise 
                                              
2
 Prior to trial, the parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). 
 
3
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We lack jurisdiction to review the 
Magistrate Judge’s orders denying these motions because Murphy did not file a notice of 
appeal or an amended notice of appeal from these orders.  See Fed. R. App. P. 
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plenary review over the denial of these motions.  See Goodman v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 293 
F.3d 655, 664 (3d Cir. 2002).  When reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment, 
notwithstanding the verdict, also known as judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), 
see Trabal v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 269 F.3d 243, 249 (3d Cir. 2001), we 
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner and draw all 
reasonable inferences in its favor.  Pitts v. Delaware, 646 F.3d 151, 155 (3d Cir. 2011).  
A judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be granted under Rule 50(b) “only if, as a 
matter of law, the record is critically deficient of that minimum quantity of evidence” to 
sustain the verdict.  Acumen LLC v. Advance Surgical Services, Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 211 
(3d Cir. 2009); Trabal, 269 F.3d at 249 (quoting Powell v. J.T. Posey Co., 766 F.2d 131, 
133-34 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
 Murphy first asserts that he was subjected to an unreasonable seizure when the 
officers simply approached him at the bus terminal.  However, “[l]aw enforcement 
officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable seizures 
merely by approaching individuals on the street or in other public places.”  United States 
v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 
(1991) (noting that cases “make it clear that a seizure does not occur simply because a 
police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions”). 
 In any event, the Magistrate Judge properly denied Murphy’s motions because he 
failed to demonstrate that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free 
                                                                                                                                                  
4(a)(4)(B)(ii); United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664, 668 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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from unreasonable seizures.  To establish such a violation, he needed to demonstrate that 
the officers lacked a reasonable basis to suspect that he “ha[d] committed, [was] 
committing, or [was] about to commit a crime.”  Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 
439 (1984).  Here, testimony at trial established that the Lewistown bus terminal is an 
area known for heavy narcotics trafficking.  During the stop, the officers learned that 
Murphy was waiting to be picked up and taken to Huntingdon to visit two women, one of 
whom was his girlfriend.  However, Murphy could recall neither the last name of his 
alleged girlfriend nor the name of the other woman.  Furthermore, the bus on which 
Murphy had been traveling would have taken him to Huntingdon.  Finally, Officer 
Haines testified that the women whom Murphy planned to meet in Huntingdon and the 
men who arrived to pick him up were known by the officers to have connections with 
narcotics trafficking.  When taken together, these facts created reasonable suspicion that 
Murphy was involved in narcotics trafficking.  See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 
206 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000)) 
(reasonableness determined by “the totality of the circumstances, which can include [the 
individual’s] location, a history of crime in the area, [the individual’s] nervous behavior 
and evasiveness, and [the officers’] ‘commonsense judgments and inferences about 
human behavior’”).  Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge did not err in denying Murphy’s 
motions, as the evidence at trial did not support a determination that the officers 
unreasonably detained him. 
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 Likewise, Murphy’s argument that he was illegally arrested without probable 
cause is meritless.  Although he was placed in handcuffs for transport to the police 
station, the use of handcuffs does not necessarily transform an investigatory seizure into a 
formal arrest requiring probable cause.  See Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1193 
(3d Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Del Vizo, 918 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989).  Furthermore, 
relocating Murphy to the police station to continue the investigation did not convert his 
detention into an arrest.  See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504-05 (1983) (“[T]here are 
undoubtedly reasons of safety and security that would justify moving a suspect from one 
location to another during an investigatory detention, such as from an airport concourse 
to a more private area.”).  Finally, Murphy’s 45-minute wait at the station did not convert 
the detention into an arrest, as the officers acted diligently in having the canine unit 
brought to the station from Milesburg, Pennsylvania, which was approximately 45 
minutes away by car.  See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985).  
Therefore, the Magistrate Judge did not err in declining to find that Murphy had been 
illegally arrested. 
 To the extent that Murphy argues that the District Court erred in not finding that 
Officer Haines unreasonably seized and searched his backpack, his argument fails.  A 
“temporary seizure of luggage is constitutional so long as the seizure is not overly 
intrusive upon the person’s privacy interest in the property, and so long as the property is 
not detained for a long period of time.”  United States v. Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 740 (3d Cir. 
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1993).  As discussed above, the totality of the circumstances led the officers to believe 
that Murphy was involved in illegal narcotics trafficking.  Accordingly, they had 
reasonable suspicion to detain his backpack for approximately 45 minutes and submit it 
to a canine sniff test.  See id. at 741.  Furthermore, Officer Haines did not open the 
backpack until obtaining Murphy’s consent, and Murphy has not alleged that his consent 
was involuntarily given.  Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge did not err in denying 
Murphy’s motions given that the search and seizure of his backpack were reasonable. 
 In sum, after considering the evidence in the officers’ favor, we conclude that the 
jury’s verdict was supported by the record.  See Acumed, 561 F.3d at 211.  Accordingly, 
the Magistrate Judge did not err in denying Murphy’s motions for judgment as a matter 
of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) & (b). 
B. Weight of the Evidence 
 Murphy next alleges that the jury’s verdict in favor of the defendants was against 
the weight of the evidence and “must have been the product of improper sympathy for the 
police or animus towards [him].”  However, it was the jury’s duty, not ours, to “weigh 
evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses.”  United States v. Beckett, 208 F.3d 
140, 151 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 
1061, 1076 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (“a . . . court 
[must] not substitute its judgment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses for that 
of the jury”).  In light of the evidence presented at trial, a ruling for Murphy here would 
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be an impermissible substitution of our assessment of the evidence for the jury’s.  
Accordingly, we cannot agree that the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence. 
C. Denial of Motion for Appointment of Counsel 
 Finally, Murphy argues that the Magistrate Judge abused his discretion in denying 
his motion for the appointment of counsel.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 
1993).  Counsel is not warranted where the pro se litigant has the skills to handle his case.  
See id.  In denying Murphy’s request for counsel, the Magistrate Judge reasoned that his 
claims were not complex and that he appeared capable of pursuing his complaint without 
the benefit of appointed counsel.  In his brief, Murphy has not referenced any of the 
Tabron factors, see 6 F.3d at 155-56; instead, he argues only that the denial of counsel 
prevented him from impeaching Officer Haines with his prior testimony from Murphy’s 
federal criminal trial and from locating his witness, Reginald Watson.  However, we 
cannot understand how the lack of counsel prevented Murphy himself from using the 
transcript of Officer Haines’ prior testimony, which he possessed well before trial, to 
impeach Officer Haines.  Likewise, given that Murphy was still unable to identify 
Reginald Watson after the defendants provided assistance by locating three possible 
individuals with this name, we doubt that an attorney would have met with more success.  
From our review of the record, it appears that the Magistrate Judge properly applied the 
Tabron factors; accordingly, he did not abuse his discretion in denying Murphy’s motion. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
